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Summary 
 
The March 2014 European Council could enter the history books as a turning point, not only in the 
EU’s relations with Russia but also in its role as a foreign policy actor. Events in Ukraine inevitably 
dominated the Summit, with EU leaders adopting a balanced approach aimed at achieving three key 
objectives – de-escalation, containment/deterrence and cooperation – based on political and economic 
support for Ukraine, increased but limited pressure on Russia, and moves to strengthen ties with other 
EU neighbours. The Summit also discussed a range of economic and environmental policy issues, 
with the situation in Ukraine casting a long shadow over the discussion on energy policy, but failed to 
reach agreement on the EU’s climate goals to 2030, or to put more flesh on the bones of calls for a 
European “industrial renaissance”. However, two other developments were particularly significant: the 
creation of the second pillar of the future banking union, establishing a single regime for winding down 
failing banks; and changes to the savings tax directive, bringing years of negotiation to an end. 
 
Full report 
 
Following a number of unspectacular EU Summits since the end of 2012 and the cooling off  
of the ‘euro crisis’, the European Council meeting on 20-21 March 2014 has a chance to make it into 
the history books.  
 
The political agenda in the weeks and days before the Summit and at the meeting itself were 
dominated by the crisis in Ukraine and its wider implications for future relations between the EU/‘West’ 
and Russia. In reaction to the recent escalation of the crisis, EU leaders adopted a balanced 
approached based on three main pillars: (i) political and financial support for Ukraine, including the 
signing of the political provisions of the Association Agreement, financial support and the unilateral 
abolition of custom duties on products from Ukraine; (ii) increased but limited pressure on Russia by 
adding more names to the list of Russian and Ukrainian citizens subject to asset freezes and visa 
bans, and measures designed to isolate Moscow internationally; and (iii) accelerated association of 
other neighbouring countries with the EU, with a special emphasis on Moldova and Georgia, by 
bringing forward the target date for signing Association Agreements with both countries – a signal 
directed also towards Moscow. 
 
All of this is designed to avoid a further escalation of the crisis while at the same time signalling to the 
Russian leadership that EU leaders are determined and ready to keep the door open to diplomatic 
solutions. It is too soon to judge whether this approach – based on de-escalation, containment/ 
deterrence and cooperation – will work. But one thing seems clear: the EU and its members will have 
to deal with the wider implications and consequences of the crisis for some time to come, and it 
remains to be seen what impact the events of recent weeks will have on the Union’s role as a foreign 
policy actor. 
 
Besides Ukraine, EU leaders addressed a number of other issues: the European Semester, Europe 
2020, industrial competitiveness, energy/climate, taxation and banking union (the Single Resolution 
Mechanism). 
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The European Council concluded the first phase of the 2014 European Semester, but without taking any concrete policy 
decisions: the heads of state and government simply had an exchange of views regarding the economic situation. They 
also had a first discussion on the implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy ahead of the planned mid-term review at 
the Spring 2015 European Council. 
 
With respect to industrial competitiveness and policy, EU leaders highlighted the need to strengthen Europe’s 
industrial base and supported the European Commission’s call for a “European Industrial Renaissance”. However, they 
failed to present any concrete measures or a well-defined strategic plan for the long-term development of a new industrial 
policy, with the Summit Conclusions remaining vague and lacking specific policy substance on this point. 
 
On Day Two of the Summit, deliberations between the heads of state and government focused on issues related to 
energy dependency and climate change. The spirit of, and concrete results emerging from, the March European 
Council indicate that EU governments are determined to promote energy security and to reduce dependence on individual 
suppliers such as Russia. Regarding climate policy, EU leaders could not reach a compromise on new targets because of 
divisions between Member States and simply set themselves a deadline of October 2014 for a final decision on the new 
policy framework. 
 
After many years of negotiations, and following a decision by Luxembourg and Austria to give up their veto, the EU-28 
were finally able to strike a compromise on changes to the Directive on the taxation of savings income. This opens the 
way for an automatic exchange of tax information between EU countries by 2017 and strengthens the Union’s negotiating 
position on savings taxation vis-á-vis third countries (including Switzerland). 
 
After months of intense discussions, the Council and European Parliament also reached a deal on the second pillar of the 
future banking union – the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) – which establishes a single regime for winding down 
failing banks. Following pressure from MEPs, the final deal is better than the original proposal, but the system remains 
highly complex and doubts persist about whether the SRM will be enough in practice and whether it will ultimately help to 
break the link between banks and sovereigns. 
 
Ukrainian crisis – a turning point in EU foreign policy? 
 
Day One of the Summit, which started with the traditional meeting with European Parliament President Martin Schulz, was 
almost totally dominated by the crisis in Ukraine after Russia had occupied and annexed (or “re-unified” – as Moscow 
argues – with) Crimea in the week of the European Council meeting – a move condemned by the EU and its members as 
illegal and illegitimate. 
 
In reaction to the escalating crisis, EU leaders adopted a balanced approach based on the three main pillars: political and 
financial support for Ukraine; increased but limited pressure on Russia; and accelerated association of other neighbouring 
countries with the EU. 
 
Political and financial support for Ukraine 
 
Following recent events and the ratcheting up of tensions, the Union and its members were eager to move Ukraine closer 
to the EU. In a move designed to intensify relations and show solidarity and support for Kiev, EU leaders and Ukrainian 
Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk signed – in a ceremonial act before the start of Day Two of the Summit – the political 
provisions of the Association Agreement; the very issue that sparked the crisis last November and eventually led to the 
revolution in Ukraine.  
 
EU leaders also reiterated their commitment to sign the remaining economic parts of the agreement, establishing a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the EU and Ukraine, probably after Ukrainian elections scheduled for  
25 May. The first meeting under the political dialogue established through the signing of the agreement’s political 
provisions will take place in April. 
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In addition, the heads of state or government reaffirmed their readiness to provide immediate financial support (€1.6 billion) 
to Ukraine once the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Ukrainian government have agreed on the conditions for a 
support programme. To increase pressure on Kiev to embark on economic and political reforms, certain conditions have 
already been attached to this support. EU leaders stressed the need for Kiev to ensure the inclusiveness of governmental 
structures, reflect regional diversity and protect national minorities, undertake constitutional reforms, fight corruption, 
enhance the transparency of fiscal operations, and investigate all human rights’ violations and acts of violence. The latter 
includes an investigation into the circumstances which led to the bloodshed on Maidan square in February 2014.  
 
Finally, the EU decided to unilaterally abolish custom duties on products from Ukraine which, according to European 
Commission estimates, will save the country around €500 million a year. 
 
Increased but limited pressure on Russia 
 
After lengthy discussions, the heads of state and government decided to increase pressure on Moscow while at the same 
time leaving the door open for diplomatic initiatives aimed to de-escalate the crisis. In the words of European Council 
President Herman Van Rompuy: “In a situation like this we all must remain cool-headed. The goal is de-escalation and a 
political solution, while respecting international law.” 
 
Condemning the “illegal annexation” of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation and in reaction to Russia’s 
refusal to take steps to de-escalate the crisis, EU leaders decided to increase pressures on Moscow by: (i) imposing asset 
freezes and visa bans on 12 more Russian and Ukrainian citizens, added to the original list of 21 people agreed on  
16-17 March (unlike Washington, which blacklisted senior Russian figures and even a Russian bank – Rossiya Bank – 
with close links to President Putin just as EU leaders were gathering in Brussels, the EU’s list of additional names does not 
include people in Putin’s inner circle); (ii) cancelling the next EU-Russia Summit and announcing that Member States will 
not hold bilateral summits/meetings with Moscow for the time being; (iii) further isolating Russia internationally by not 
involving Moscow in the next meeting of the G7 and suspending negotiations on Russia joining the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
 
While EU leaders increased their pressure on the Russian leadership, they refrained from more severe sanctions going 
beyond the so-called ‘stage 2’ level. However, the Summit Conclusions warn that any further steps by the Russian 
Federation to “destabilise the situation in Ukraine” would have “additional and far reaching consequences” for the 
relationship between the EU and Russia.  
 
In more concrete terms, the European Council has asked the Commission and Member States to “prepare targeted 
measures”, without giving any details of when this list of potential measures will be ready and what it might contain. In his 
press conference after the Summit, British Prime Minister David Cameron was more explicit when he mentioned “finance, 
military, energy” as areas being considered. Asked which Russian actions might trigger more severe reactions, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel said that economic sanctions would ‘only’ be imposed if Russia sought to occupy parts of 
Ukraine beyond Crimea. 
 
The fact that EU governments decided not to impose harsher sanctions signals a number of things. First, a vast majority of 
Member States want to avoid a negative spiral of escalation and mutual retaliation, which could easily spin out of control, 
with severe economic and political costs on both sides. Russia could even raise the stakes by halting cooperation with the 
‘West’ on the civil war in Syria, Iran’s nuclear programme or the fight against international terrorism. Second, Europeans 
do not want to enter ‘stage 3’ too quickly, thus giving themselves more room to intensify the pressure on the Russian 
leadership if the crisis escalates still further. Third, EU leaders fear the imposition of severe sanctions from which neither 
side would be able to backtrack even if the situation de-escalates. Fourth, EU governments are (compared, for example, to 
the US) much more subject to legal constraints which make it more difficult for them to target individuals not directly 
involved in the incident that triggered the sanctions – in this case, the annexation of Crimea. Last but not least, there was a 
heated debate between the EU-28 behind the scenes about whether to impose tougher sanctions in response to the 
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annexation of Crimea. Some countries – including Poland, the Baltic states, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Romania, and Sweden – wanted a more robust response to send an even stronger signal to the Russian 
leadership, while others – including Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Spain – were (very) 
reluctant to go further because of strong economic, financial, historical or even religious ties. (See also Paul Ivan, “EU´s 
sanctions against Russia – the need for clear goals”, EPC Commentary, 21 March 2014). 
 
Accelerated association of other neighbouring countries 
 
Another development at the EU Summit which attracted much less attention in European and international media was the 
decision by EU leaders to speed up the process of strengthening political and economic ties between the EU and Moldova 
and Georgia. The European Council agreed to bring forward the target date for signing Association Agreements with both 
countries, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, from August to June 2014. 
 
This is a clear response to the increased pressures Moscow has been putting on Moldova and Georgia in an attempt to 
avoid a further strengthening of ties between these countries and the EU. The main concern here is Moldova, which has to 
cope with separatist tendencies in Transnistria and which is particularly vulnerable to Russian political and economic 
pressures (for more, see Paul Ivan, “Transnistria – where to?”, EPC Policy Brief, March 2014). 
 
What comes next? Uncertainties and difficult choices 
 
As things stand now, EU governments and institutions are clearly intent on avoiding a further escalation of the crisis while 
at the same time signalling to the Russian leadership their determination and readiness to return to a cooperative 
environment despite the loss of trust. 
 
The decisions taken at the Summit indicate that EU leaders want to contain the crisis, amid fears that it could pose the 
most severe security challenge in Europe since the end of the Cold War if events spiral out of control. First and foremost, 
they want to avoid a military conflict in their direct neighbourhood, which could, for example, be triggered by an (even 
accidental) incident between Russia and Ukraine. 
 
EU leaders (and the US) also wanted to signal to Russian President Vladimir Putin and his associates that they will not 
simply tolerate the annexation of Crimea and infringement of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, although they are aware 
that there is little they can do but accept that Crimea is probably a lost case and now part of the Russian Federation. The 
EU and its members want to signal that they will not accept such breaches of international law in future and are 
determined to contain Russia and to increase pressures if Moscow decides to further escalate the situation in the eastern 
or southern part of Ukraine. EU governments seem confident that Moscow will not, in the end, prevail if it decides to 
embark on a path of continuous provocation/confrontation. 
 
However, at the same time and for good reasons, EU governments do not want to return to the mind-set of Cold War 
confrontation in today’s fundamentally different world. The global and regional environment has become much more 
complex and interdependent, and it makes no sense to return to the past given that current and future challenges require 
cooperation among global actors and regional partners to find solutions rather than outdated rituals and actions. However, 
the events of recent months and weeks have undermined trust between Moscow and the EU, and it will be more than 
difficult to restore the minimum level of faith in each other that will be necessary to return to a logic of cooperation. 
 
But will an EU approach based on de-escalation, containment/deterrence and cooperation work to serve this purpose? It is 
too early to give a definite answer to this question now because of a number of uncertainties: 
 
 There still is a danger that the stand-off between Ukraine and Russia could escalate, although the fact that the 
Russian government finally agreed, on the day after the Summit, to a mission by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to monitor the security situation in Ukraine might be a first signal that Moscow is ready 
to de-escalate after annexing Crimea. 
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 Ukraine’s future is by no means certain as long as the country’s internal coherence remains under threat. In the 
immediate future, much will depend on the outcome of the upcoming elections and the readiness and ability of the 
future Ukrainian leadership to unite the country by accommodating regional diversities, including different political 
forces and protecting the rights of national minorities. Following the annexation of Crimea, the stand-off between Kiev 
and Moscow has already shifted to eastern Ukraine and it remains to be seen how the situation will develop in  
this part of the country and whether the Russian leadership might pursue actions aiming to (further) destabilise  
the situation. 
 It is highly uncertain how Russia will react to a closer association between the EU and Ukraine if the new leadership in 
Kiev decides to sign and implement the remaining parts of the Association Agreement. Moscow might argue that the 
agreement ‘violates’ Ukraine’s neutrality and impose sanctions on the new leadership in Kiev claiming that new 
economic ties between the EU and Ukraine breach Russia’s accords with its western neighbour. 
 Even if Russia decides to refrain from a further escalation, the conflicting parties, the EU and the US may all have to 
cope with Crimea becoming another frozen conflict like those in Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria and South Ossetia, 
and thus one more source of instability at the heart of Europe. This can only be avoided if Ukrainian and Russian 
authorities decide to get round the negotiating table to define the conditions of a new modus vivendi, which would be 
very difficult given recent events and the high level of distrust between the two sides. 
 Even if one assumes that the current crisis will de-escalate (one way or another), it cannot be ruled out that the 
current leadership in Moscow might decide to continue playing the role of ‘guardian of Russian ethnic minorities’ in 
other parts of Europe, especially now that President Putin has seen his popularity ratings rise sharply in Russia in 
recent weeks. 
 
All these potential challenges and uncertainties underline the volatility and complexity of the current situation. However, 
one thing is clear: whatever happens, the EU is now under much greater pressure than in the past to rise to the challenge, 
especially as it has become an active player in a multifaceted crisis right on its borders which is not likely to be 
solved/overcome any time soon. 
 
As a consequence, the Union and its members will have to do many things in parallel while constantly considering the 
long-term consequences of their actions. The EU will have to: (i) keep up the pressure on Moscow while at the same time 
trying to avoid a further deterioration of the economically and politically significant bilateral relationship between the EU 
and Russia; (ii) support Ukraine without pushing the country to choose between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’, which could 
eventually tear it apart; (iii) explore ways to bridge the political gap between Moscow and the EU while learning from 
mistakes committed in the past; or (iv) if relations deteriorate still further, identify ways to manage the consequences of a 
severe and long-term stand-off with the Union’s biggest neighbour to the East. 
 
These are issues that the EU and its members may have to wrestle with for months and even years. From today’s 
perspective, it is almost impossible to judge the potential long-term consequences of the ‘Ukrainian crisis’. Future 
historians may well come to the conclusion that the developments in Ukraine and the wider implications of the crisis for the 
relationship with Russia were a turning point in the Union’s role and self-understanding as a foreign policy actor.  
Jan Techau might be right in his assessment that “Ukraine is the first real strategic test of EU foreign policy” (see “Ukraine, 
the Birthplace of Strategic Europe?”, Carnegie Europe, 18 March 2014).  
 
Taking this one step further, future historians may well judge that shortly after the worst of the ‘euro crisis’ appeared to be 
behind the EU, the foreign policy crisis triggered by events in Ukraine made it even more necessary to further deepen 
cooperation between the countries of the Union – although this is a bold thesis at this point in time. 
 
Besides the crisis in Ukraine and future relations with Moscow, the European Council addressed the following issues: the 
European Semester, Europe 2020, industrial competitiveness, energy/climate, taxation and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism. 
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European Semester and Europe 2020 strategy – many words, but no concrete decisions! 
 
The March European Council concluded the first phase of the 2014 European Semester by taking stock of the current 
economic situation and reiterating the policy priorities for this year. EU leaders had already decided, in December 2013, to 
put particular emphasis on policies enhancing competitiveness, supporting job creation and fighting unemployment 
(particularly among young people) and on the follow-up to reforms aimed at improving the functioning of labour markets. 
 
EU leaders stressed that for the first time since the European Semester was launched a few years ago, the overall 
economic outlook seems more positive and promising. But they simply had an exchange of views with European Central 
Bank President Mario Draghi and did not take any concrete decisions. The Conclusions merely state that National Reform 
Programmes and Stability and Convergence Programmes should “respond in a concrete and ambitious manner” to last 
year’s Country Specific Recommendations and address the issues identified in the Commission’s recent analysis in the 
context of the Stability and Growth Pact and the macroeconomic imbalances procedures. 
 
As expected, the heads of state and government did not discuss how to step up the economic coordination process in the 
framework of the European Semester. There was, for example, no debate on the idea of introducing “contractual 
arrangements” between individual Member States and the Commission to promote the implementation of structural reforms 
in the framework of the Semester by enhancing national ownership and providing specific financial incentives. 
 
The European Council also had their first discussion about the implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy ahead of the 
planned mid-term review scheduled for the Spring 2015 Summit, which will be based on the results of a Commission 
communication. In the Conclusions, EU leaders acknowledge that progress towards meeting the strategy’s key goals has 
“slowed down” because of the crisis and that the long-term challenges affecting growth in Europe have “not gone away”. At 
a press conference during the Summit, President Van Rompuy and President Barroso acknowledged that the EU had fallen 
behind on some of its social targets, especially those relating to unemployment and poverty. However, EU leaders did not 
adopt any new measures and the Summit Conclusions merely state that efforts should be stepped up to reach the Europe 
2020 targets and that the European Council “looks forward” to the planned review in 2015. 
 
Industrial competitiveness – renaissance without strategy 
 
A lengthy section of the Summit Conclusions (three pages) is devoted to industrial competitiveness and policy, calling for a 
“European Industrial Renaissance”. The message from EU leaders is clear: industry is a key element of Europe’s economic 
competitiveness and the Union needs a “strong and competitive industrial base” as a key driver for economic growth and 
jobs. However, they did not present concrete measures to achieve this or agree a well-defined strategic plan for the  
long-term development of a new industrial policy (for more, see Claire Dhéret, “Sharing the same vision – the cornerstone of 
a new industrial policy for Europe”, EPC Discussion Paper, March 2014). 
 
On the contrary, the Conclusions are vague and lack substance when it comes to enhancing Europe’s industrial 
competiveness. Here some illustrative examples: “industrial competitiveness should be systematically mainstreamed across 
all EU policy areas”; “efforts must continue to complete and fully exploit the potential of the internal market in goods and 
services”; “infrastructure networks…need to be developed and updated with intelligent and innovative technologies”; “smart 
specialisation should be promoted at all levels”, and “efforts should continue to improve market access around the world by 
facilitating the integration of European companies in global value chains”.  
 
The most concrete proposal relates to promoting key enabling technologies, where the Conclusions call for the swift 
identification of projects aimed at strengthening key technologies, such as batteries for electro-mobility, intelligent materials, 
high-performance production and industrial bio-processes.  
 
Regarding next steps, EU leaders have invited the Council, Commission and Member States “to continue work” and the 
European Council will come back to all these issues in the context of the Europe 2020 review in March 2015. 
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Energy and climate – determination to reduce energy dependence; no decision on new climate targets (yet) 
 
After the Ukraine Association Agreement signing ceremony, Day Two of the Summit concentrated on two issues: energy 
and climate. Against the backdrop of the latest developments in Ukraine, the discussions focused on the need to enhance 
energy security and reduce energy dependence, especially from Russia. 
 
EU leaders committed themselves to intensify efforts to reduce energy dependency by developing an internal market for 
energy, enhancing the diversification of energy resources and reducing energy demand through increased energy 
efficiency. For as President Van Rompuy warned: “If we don’t take action now, by 2035 we’ll be dependent on foreign 
exports for up to 80% of our oil and gas.” 
 
The spirit of, and concrete results emerging from, the Summit clearly indicate that EU governments are now much more 
determined to reduce energy dependence, which comes as no surprise given the Ukrainian crisis and the challenges it 
poses to Europe’s energy security. Russia provides around 30% of the EU’s natural gas and is its main supplier of crude oil 
(around 35%). Within the Union, Germany is the largest importer of Russian gas and some EU countries – including the 
Baltic states, Bulgaria and Finland – import almost all of their gas from Russia. 
 
In recent years, the EU and its members have taken a number of steps to promote energy security and reduce dependence 
on individual suppliers. The Union’s gas network has become more integrated, the installation of interconnectors has 
progressed and reverse-flow technology, which allows gas to be transported in the other direction, has been extended. 
However, progress has been slow and much more needs to be done, given that despite all these efforts, EU energy imports 
increased from 63.4% in 2009 to 65.8% in 2012 (Eurostat) and the EU’s dependence on energy imports is predicted to grow 
still further given the expected decline of European sources of gas. 
 
To reduce its energy dependence, the EU will have to take a holistic approach which aims to create an integrated energy 
market with a cross-border energy infrastructure, increase the share of renewables, diversify energy routes and imported 
sources of energy (including imports from the US, which has become a net producer of energy due to shale gas), add more 
reverse-flow corridors, enlarge storage reserves, pool the EU’s purchasing power by jointly negotiating contracts with 
energy suppliers and, last but not least, increase energy efficiency (for more, see also Annika Ahtonen, “Russian 
belligerence and Europe’s energy security”, EPC Commentary, 19 March 2014). 
 
The Summit Conclusions reflect the need to do all of this. However, the heads of state and government did not take any 
new or concrete policy decisions, but rather called on the Commission to conduct an “in-depth study of EU energy security” 
and present a comprehensive plan for reducing energy dependency by June 2014. This plan is supposed to reflect the EU’s 
need to “accelerate further diversification of its energy supply, increase its bargaining power and energy efficiency, continue 
to develop renewable and other indigenous energy sources, and coordinate the development of the infrastructure to support 
this diversification in a sustainable manner, including through the development of interconnections”. EU leaders also 
signalled that Member States will show solidarity in case of “sudden disruptions of energy supply”. 
 
Regarding climate policy and the goal of reaching a compromise among Member States on the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions in preparation for the December 2015 Global Climate Conference in Paris, the heads of state and 
government launched the debate among themselves on the 2030 climate goals but could not reach a compromise now 
given significant differences in their positions. 
 
Earlier this year, the Commission proposed to set a target for 2030 of reducing emissions by 40% from 1990 levels (up a 
20% reduction by 2020). The Brussels executive wanted a political decision from EU governments by June, so the Union 
could go to the next United Nations summit in September with a joint position and thus spur other global powers to put 
forward their commitments, increasing the chances of a successful outcome of climate negotiations in Paris. 
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But the issue has split the EU into two camps. A number of eastern European countries – including Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia – are worried about both the timeline and the overall target. They are 
also asking for a fair ‘burden-sharing’ between the EU-28 based on national impact assessments. Only then will they agree 
on specific targets and dates. 
 
Other Member States – including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Portugal and the UK – actively support the Commission’s proposal and want a quick agreement among EU 
governments. But the so-called “Green Growth Group”, which also supports an EU-wide commitment to a renewable 
energy target of 27% (up from an expected share in 2020 of 21%), could not convince their partners of this during the 
Summit. As a consequence, EU leaders have now agreed that they will come back to the issue in June to take stock of the 
progress made, with the aim of taking a final decision on the new policy framework no later than October 2014. 
 
Taxation of savings income – finally, a compromise! 
 
After many years of negotiations and opposition from individual Member States, the EU-28 were finally able to reach a 
compromise on the revision of the Directive on the taxation of savings income. Following increased pressure from EU 
partners and at international level, especially from the US, Luxembourg and Austria became the last Member States to give 
up their veto on the revised Directive, which will increase transparency through automatic exchanges of tax information 
between EU countries by 2017. This will help tax authorities to identify and chase up cross-border tax evaders and close 
pension and investment fund loopholes, as the EU-28 do not currently exchange data on interest earned from financial 
products linked to investment funds, pensions, trust or foundations. 
 
It is also hoped that the agreement on the revised Directive will strengthen the Union’s negotiating position on savings 
taxation vis-á-vis third countries such as Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and, most importantly, Switzerland. 
The EU aims to commit these countries to fully implement the new single global standard for an automatic exchange of 
information developed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and endorsed by the G20. 
The European Council calls on the Commission to move forward in negotiations with these countries swiftly, with a view to 
concluding them by the end of the year, and to report on the state of play at its December 2014 meeting. If there is no 
progress in these talks with third countries, the Commission should explore possible options to ensure compliance with the 
new global standard. 
 
Single Resolution Mechanism and Single Resolution Fund – a deal with uncertainties 
 
After months of intense discussions and following a final marathon negotiation which lasted 16 hours and ended just hours 
before the start of the Summit, EU governments – represented by the Greek Council Presidency and the Eurogroup 
President, the European Parliament and the Commission (trialogue) – reached a deal on the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM), the second pillar of the banking union to stand alongside the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).  
 
The agreement still requires final approval by the European Parliament and Council, before the Parliament closes down for 
the elections, so that it can enter into force on 1 January 2015. It establishes a single regime for winding down banks 
involving a complex decision-making process which will be triggered by the ECB as the supervisory authority, and a 
common fund (Single Resolution Fund) worth €55 billion provided by banks to cover some of the potential resolution costs, 
but only after bank shareholders, junior and senior bondholders as well as large banks’ savers and institutional investors will 
have been obliged to cover the losses of a failing bank (bail-in). 
 
The final deal reached in the trialogue is better than the original proposal agreed between EU governments in December 
2013, but the system remains highly complex and doubts persist about whether the SRM will be enough in practice and 
whether it will ultimately break the link between banks and sovereigns. 
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The SRM compromise involves a regulation covering the main aspects of the mechanism and an intergovernmental 
agreement on the creation of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). Key decisions will be taken by a Single Resolution Board 
involving permanent members as well as the Commission, the Council, the ECB (as the supervisory authority) and national 
resolution authorities.  
 
The compromise between the Parliament and Council has streamlined the decision-making process somewhat, with the 
role of EU governments and national resolution authorities reduced with respect to bank resolutions involving less than  
€5 billion from the Single Resolution Fund, which will be owned and administered by the Board. A resolution scheme 
prepared by the Commission, setting out how resolution tools and funds will be used in cases below €5 billion, will be 
adopted by a smaller group of Board members (meeting in “executive session”), including the Chair, the Executive Director 
and three other permanent members. This streamlined procedure is supposed to speed up the process and make it “less 
prone” to political interference. The whole Board will only come together in “plenary session” if it is deciding on a bank 
resolution involving more than €5 billion in a single decision. In such cases, the largest EU countries (such as Germany or 
France) will have almost enough votes to veto a decision. 
 
Following pressure from MEPs, EU governments agreed that the €55 billion in the Single Resolution Fund, which amounts 
to 1% of covered deposits, will be fully capitalised within eight years instead of the ten originally envisaged. The money 
made available to the fund through contributions from banks will also be mutualised faster than originally planned: 40% of 
the funds, which banks will originally pay into “national compartments”, will have to be mutualised after the first year and 
another 20% after the second, with the rest spread equally over the remaining six years. 
 
The compromise reached in the trialogue also foresees allowing the Single Resolution Fund to borrow on the markets if the 
Board decides to do this at a plenary session. This would allow the Fund’s firepower to be strengthened in the early years 
when it has not yet accumulated the full €55 billion. However, the details of the lending facility are still unclear. 
 
The establishment of a Single Resolution Mechanism is a major step forward which would have been unthinkable some 
years ago, and the fact that the EU institutions kept their promise by striking a compromise before the European elections 
and before the ECB takes up its role as a single supervisory authority is likely to further strengthen market confidence. The 
new system is definitely an improvement on the past, as it limits the need for massive bailouts financed solely by taxpayers 
and goes beyond a simple network of national resolution authorities. 
 
But despite the abovementioned improvements/benefits, there are some unresolved issues and doubts about whether the 
scheme goes far enough and whether it will work in practice, for a number of reasons: 
 
 The €55 billion foreseen for the Single Resolution Fund is a rather small amount considering that potential losses in the 
European banking sector might be much bigger, maybe even amounting to hundreds of billion. This deficit is 
aggravated by the fact the Fund is not allowed to use the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a final backstop, 
which de facto means that primary responsibility for winding down banks may, at the end of the day, still remains and 
burdens their home countries. The fact that the SRM regime does not include the “appropriate and effective backstop 
arrangement” called for in previous European Council Conclusions could undermine the credibility of the new system 
and fail to break the negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns. 
 Although it has been streamlined, the SRM decision-making process still remains very cumbersome, complicated and 
subject to potential vetoes and political interference, which in practice could make it difficult to reach agreement on a 
resolution scheme within the 48 hours required if a decision to shut down a bank had to be taken over a weekend. 
 The fact that the Single Resolution Fund will, following German pressure, be created on the basis of an 
intergovernmental agreement limits the power of scrutiny at European level, especially in relation to the European 
Parliament’s powers. Some MEPs have already suggested that the intergovernmental agreement should be 
challenged in the European Court of Justice. 
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 There is not yet an agreement on how the Single Resolution Fund will be filled by banks and a “real tug-of-war”, as 
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble put it, can be expected between EU governments and institutions over 
how the levy will be organised in concrete terms on the basis of a Commission proposal. 
 
The above limitations and uncertainties as well as the fact that the established banking union does not include a single 
European deposit insurance scheme (the ‘third pillar’) means that the system now in place is still limited. However, the fact 
that the intergovernmental agreement on the Single Resolution Fund includes a ‘repatriation clause’ – which states that the 
substance of the agreement should be integrated into the legal framework of the EU within ten years, at most, of its entry 
into force – might provide an opportunity to reform the EU Treaties and move from a ‘limited’ to a ‘full banking union’ worthy 
of the name in the foreseeable future. 
 
EU-Africa Summit and Sri Lanka 
 
Besides Ukraine, the European Council Conclusions refer to two other external relations issues: EU-Africa relations and  
Sri Lanka. 
 
Ahead of the 4th EU-Africa summit on 2-3 April 2014 in Brussels, EU leaders stressed that the Union remains committed 
to building a partnership of equals with Africa. They want to emphasise cooperation in a number of key areas: trade and 
development, democracy and good governance, the rule of law and human rights, and migration and mobility, including 
irregular migration and the fight against the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings. The European Council 
also stressed that the EU will continue to provide operational support through its civilian crisis management missions and 
military operations, and consider ways and means to strengthen the African peace and security architecture and help 
African partners prevent conflict and address crises. 
 
Finally, following particular pressure from the UK, EU leaders support the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ 
recommendation and called for the adoption of a resolution on Sri Lanka at the Human Rights Council providing for an 
international investigation into alleged war crimes by both sides during the war. 
 
 
Janis A. Emmanouilidis is Director of Studies and Head of the European Politics and Institutions Programme at the 
European Policy Centre (EPC). 
 
